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DEFINING “SPECIAL CARE”
BEN GIFFORD*
For the better part of the last century, the Supreme Court has held that
courts must evaluate the voluntariness of juvenile confessions with “special
care.” This special care requirement cautions courts against judging
juveniles “by the more exacting standards of maturity” or comparing a
juvenile suspect “with an adult in full possession of his senses and
knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.” It also instructs
courts to ensure that a juvenile’s “admission was voluntary, in the sense not
only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product
of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.”
Despite the force with which the Supreme Court has spoken on the issue,
lower courts regularly fail to follow the special care mandate. Some
overlook the standard altogether, while others only pay lip service to it, and
still others misconstrue it and disregard it on mistaken grounds. The result
in any of these cases is that lower courts assess the voluntariness of juvenile
confessions in the same way they would evaluate confessions obtained from
adults, not with the heightened degree of scrutiny that Supreme Court
precedent requires.
In order to tether courts more firmly to the mast of special care, this
Article highlights specific factors that courts should consider when
evaluating the voluntariness of juvenile confessions. By framing their
analyses in terms of these factors, courts can hopefully begin to evaluate
juvenile confessions with the requisite level of care.
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INTRODUCTION
Roughly one million juveniles are arrested in the United States each
year.1 Many of these young individuals are interrogated by law enforcement
officers, as are countless others who are subjected to questioning without
formal arrest.2 Unless specifically requested by the juvenile, most states do
not require the presence of a parent, lawyer, or other interested adult during
the interrogation.3
Unsurprisingly, juvenile interrogations raise a number of pressing
concerns. Not only are youths less capable than adults of understanding and
exercising their constitutional rights,4 but they are also uniquely susceptible
to “the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.”5 Coupled with
the fact that interrogators often fail to tailor their techniques to account for
the age of their suspect,6 this susceptibility gives rise to a heightened risk of
involuntary confessions in children.7 The younger the child, the greater the
risk.8

1
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK: JUVENILE ARRESTS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojs
tatbb/crime/qa05101.asp [perma.cc/7KKC-ESYX] [hereinafter OJJDP, JUVENILE ARRESTS].
2
STUDY: FEW JUVENILE SUSPECTS EXERCISE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING
INTERROGATIONS, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.apa.org/news/press/
releases/2014/08/juvenile-suspects.aspx [perma.cc/32ST-KEXD].
3
Joanna S. Markman, In re Gault: A Retrospective in 2007: Is It Working? Can It Work?,
9 BARRY L. REV. 123, 133 (2007).
4
See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
5
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966); see infra Section I.C.
6
Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and
Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 222 (2006) (“Interrogation manuals recommend
that police use the same techniques with children as with adults, despite developmental
psychologists’ doubts that juveniles possess the cognitive ability or judgment necessary to
function on par with adults.”).
7
See infra Section I.C.
8
See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
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Recognizing the heightened risk inherent in juvenile confessions, the
Supreme Court has long held that courts must evaluate the voluntariness of
these confessions with “special care” before admitting them in evidence.9
The special care standard cautions courts against judging juveniles “by the
more exacting standards of maturity”10 or comparing a juvenile suspect “with
an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the
consequences of his admissions.”11 It also instructs courts to ensure that a
juvenile’s “admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not
coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of
rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.”12
Despite the force with which the Supreme Court has spoken on the
topic, lower courts regularly fail to adhere to the special care mandate.13
Some overlook the standard altogether,14 while others only pay lip service to
it,15 and still others misconstrue and incorrectly disregard it.16 The result in
any of these scenarios is that lower courts assess the voluntariness of juvenile
confessions in the same way that they would evaluate confessions obtained
from adults, instead of applying the heightened degree of scrutiny that
Supreme Court precedent requires.
In order to tether courts more firmly to the mast of special care, this
Article highlights specific factors that courts should consider when
evaluating the voluntariness of juvenile confessions. Part I begins by
providing a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s voluntariness
jurisprudence, before exploring both the history and importance of the
special care requirement. Part II then highlights various ways in which lower
courts have misapplied the special care standard, which range from ignoring
it to misconstruing it. Part III concludes by offering a definition of special
care that centers around interrogation tactics that are particularly likely to
cause involuntary confessions in juveniles. By framing their analyses in
terms of these tactics, courts can hopefully begin to evaluate juvenile
confessions with the requisite level of care.

9
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53 (1962) (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599
(1948) (plurality opinion)).
10
Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion).
11
Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54.
12
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
13
See infra Part II.
14
See infra Section II.A.
15
See infra Section II.B.
16
See infra Section II.C.
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I. THE “SPECIAL CARE” REQUIREMENT
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF VOLUNTARINESS

For over a century, the Supreme Court has made clear that involuntary
confessions are inadmissible as evidence against the accused. As early as
1884, the Court stated that “a confession made to one authority should not go
to the jury unless it appears to the court to have been voluntary.”17 Fifteen
years later, the Court issued several decisions in which it reaffirmed that “a
confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary.”18 In these
early cases, the Court understood itself to be continuing a tradition that had
long been established at common law.19 Its decisions were motivated in large
part by concerns about the reliability of involuntary confessions:
A confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the most satisfactory
character . . . . But the presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence . . .
ceases when the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of
inducements of a temporal nature . . . or because of a threat or promise . . . which,
operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, . . . deprives him of that freedom of
will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of
the law.20

At the same time that the Court was situating its voluntariness analysis
within common law traditions, it was also framing its inquiry in terms of
constitutional rules. In 1897, the Court wrote in Bram v. United States21 that
for federal criminal cases, “where-ever a question arises whether a confession
is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.’”22 Forty years later, in Brown v. Mississippi,23 the

17

Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 587 (1884).
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (quoting 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL
RUSSELL, RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (Horace Smith and A. P. P. Keep eds., 6th ed. 1896)); see
also Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621–22 (1896); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S.
355, 357 (1896); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895).
19
Bram, 168 U.S. at 545–46 (first quoting 1 LORD HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 304 (1st ed. 1736), for the proposition that “the confession before one of the privy
council or a justice of the peace being voluntarily made, without torture, is sufficient as to the
indictment on trial” in cases of treason; and then quoting LORD GILBERT, THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 139 (2d ed. 1760), for the proposition that a “confession must be voluntary, and
without compulsion”).
20
Hopt, 110 U.S. at 584–85 (citations omitted).
21
168 U.S. 532.
22
Id. at 542; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
18
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Court held that involuntary confessions are similarly barred from admission
in state courts by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24
In the decades following Brown, the Court fleshed out the contours of
its voluntariness analysis. Its decisions echoed earlier cases’ worries about
the reliability of involuntary confessions,25 but they also evinced less
pragmatic concerns about the moral impropriety of abusive interrogation
practices.26 Most of the Court’s voluntariness cases during this period were
state court cases analyzed through the lens of the Due Process Clause,27 and
although the Court eventually incorporated the Fifth Amendment privilege
against the states,28 the two constitutional provisions have been interpreted
to impose the same test29: for state and federal cases alike, a confession is
admissible only if it is voluntary under “the totality of the circumstances.”30
In guiding lower courts’ evaluation of the totality of the circumstances,
the Supreme Court has highlighted several issues to consider. Courts must
first make a threshold finding of interrogator coercion before holding a
confession involuntary,31 and they then should review factors like “the length
of the interrogation; its location; its continuity; the defendant’s maturity;
education; physical condition; and mental health.”32 Although the Supreme
Court has “suggested that the use of physical violence or threats of physical
violence or both are per se impermissible,”33 it has also made clear that
24

Id. at 287; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
26
See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959); see also Eve Brensike
Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 9 (2015) (“[H]istorically and as a matter of current practice there are two strands of
voluntariness analysis—one deontological and one consequentialist. The deontological branch
is concerned with action that is bad in and of itself regardless of its effect on the suspect . . . .
The consequentialist branch concerns police action that is bad because of its tendency to
produce unreliable confessions . . . .”).
27
2 JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: VOLUME 1:
INVESTIGATION 421 (7th ed. 2017).
28
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
29
See DRESSLER ET AL., supra note 27, at 421–22.
30
Although the Court had previously alluded to the importance of individualized
circumstances in evaluating a confession’s voluntariness, see, e.g., Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S.
574, 583 (1884) (“The admissibility of such evidence so largely depends upon the special
circumstances connected with the confession, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate
a rule that will comprehend all cases.”); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945) (“If
all the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession was coerced or compelled, it may
not be used to convict a defendant.”), the first reference to the “totality of the circumstances”
appears in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957).
31
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986).
32
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693 (1993) (citations omitted).
33
Primus, supra note 26, at 26.
25
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“coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused
is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.”34 Furthermore,
the Court has held that the voluntariness of a confession is a legal question,35
whose resolution depends on a subjective inquiry into “whether a defendant’s
will was overborne in a particular case.”36
In addition to governing the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession
itself, the totality-of-the-circumstances test governs the voluntariness of a
defendant’s waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona.37 Although Miranda
“drastically changed the landscape of confession suppression jurisprudence
and shifted much of the courts’, litigants’, and commentators’ attention from
the due process issue of involuntariness to issues concerning the application
and waiver of Miranda rights,”38 due process challenges “remain[] a vital and
perplexing feature of the criminal justice system in the United States when
considering the admissibility of confessions.”39 As a result, courts will often
review the voluntariness of a defendant’s initial Miranda waiver in light of
the totality of the circumstances, before separately evaluating the
voluntariness of the subsequent confession under the same standard.40
B. THE SPECIAL CARE STANDARD

At the same time that the Court was fleshing out its general
voluntariness test, it was also articulating specific standards regarding the
34

Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985).
36
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); see Miller, 474 U.S. at 116
(“[T]he admissibility of a confession turns . . . on whether the techniques for extracting the
statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes innocence
and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means . . . .”).
37
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that a suspect in custodial interrogation must be
advised of various rights—including his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney—
and that the suspect must “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently” waive those rights in order
for any subsequent confession to be admissible); see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421
(1986) (“Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an
uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that
the Miranda rights have been waived.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38
Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession
Suppression Law, 38 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 109, 120 (2012).
39
Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of
Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 642 (2006) (“Miranda applies
to many cases and disposes of a good number of them. However, literally thousands of
prosecutions can be found throughout the country where serious due process challenges are
raised so that the government has to offer substantial evidence to rebut the claim of
constitutional violations.”).
40
See, e.g., State v. Goodwin, 774 N.W.2d 733 (Neb. 2009); infra text accompanying
notes 120–123.
35
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confessions of juvenile suspects. In Haley v. Ohio,41 the Court considered
the case of John Harvey Haley, a fifteen-year-old boy who was convicted of
first-degree murder for acting as a lookout during a deadly robbery.42 Five
days after the crime took place, Haley was arrested at his home around
midnight, brought to a police station, and held in isolation.43 He was
interrogated for several hours by a series of police officers, who “questioned
him in relays of one or two each.”44 Finally, at five o’clock in the morning,
Haley confessed after the officers showed him alleged confessions of the
other two boys suspected of participating in the crime.45
At trial, Haley argued that his confession had been obtained through
duress, and he objected to its admission in evidence.46 The judge
nevertheless submitted the question of voluntariness to the jury, which found
against Haley and convicted him.47 The intermediate appellate court
affirmed with minimal elaboration on the question of voluntariness,48 as did
the state high court, which dismissed Haley’s appeal “for the reason that no
debatable constitutional question is involved.”49
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.50 Writing for a
plurality, Justice Douglas began by recounting the details of Haley’s case,
before concluding, “We do not think the methods used in obtaining this
confession can be squared with that due process of law which the Fourteenth
Amendment commands.”51 Although Justice Douglas declined to answer
whether the interrogators’ tactics would have been permissible “if a mature
man were involved,” he explained that:
[W]hen, as here, a mere child — an easy victim of the law — is before us, special care
in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy
of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That

41

332 U.S. 596 (1948).
Id. at 597–98 (plurality opinion).
43
Id. at 598.
44
Id.
45
Id. There was also some evidence that Haley had been beaten by the police, but the
Court held this evidence to the side for purposes of deciding whether Haley’s confession was
voluntary. Id. at 597–98.
46
Id. at 599.
47
Id.
48
State v. Lowder, 72 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
49
State v. Haley, 70 N.E.2d 905, 905 (Ohio 1947).
50
Haley, 332 U.S. at 601 (plurality opinion); id. at 607 (Frankfurter, J., joining in reversal
of judgment).
51
Id. at 599 (plurality opinion).
42
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which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in
his early teens.52

This special care standard, which requires that juvenile confessions
receive heightened scrutiny, has been repeated and reaffirmed in the Court’s
subsequent decisions. Over a decade after Haley, in Gallegos v. Colorado53
the Court reviewed the murder conviction of Robert Gallegos, who was
fourteen years old when he robbed and assaulted an elderly man who later
died from his injuries.54 Gallegos was arrested two weeks after the incident
(while the victim was still alive), and he immediately admitted to the
crimes.55 He was then held in isolation for five days, after which he signed
a confession that formed the basis of his subsequent conviction.56
As in Haley, the state courts held that Gallegos’s confession was
voluntary and admissible,57 and as in Haley, the Supreme Court reversed.58
Now writing for a majority, Justice Douglas emphasized that a suspect’s
youth is a “crucial factor” in assessing the voluntariness of a confession, and
he quoted at length from his opinion in Haley.59 While the government
contended that Gallegos “was advised of his right to counsel, but . . . did not
ask either for a lawyer or for his parents,” the Court responded that “a 14year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception
of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to the police.”60
Moreover, the Court explained, a child “cannot be compared with an adult in
full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his
admissions.”61 The Court even went so far as to suggest that, “[w]ithout
some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be
able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had.”62
Although the Court has not insisted on this suggestion that juvenile
confessions require adult protection,63 it has continued to reiterate the prized
place that children occupy in its voluntariness jurisprudence. Not long after
Gallegos, the Court held in In re Gault64 that the privilege against self52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. (emphasis added).
370 U.S. 49 (1962).
See Gallegos v. People, 358 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Colo. 1960) (en banc).
Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 49–50.
Id. at 50.
Gallegos, 358 P.2d at 1034.
Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 55.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979).
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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incrimination and other constitutional protections must be extended to
juveniles in delinquency proceedings.65 Again quoting extensively from
Haley, the Court “emphasized that admissions and confessions of juveniles
require special caution,”66 and it noted “that the ‘distrust of confessions made
in certain situations’ . . . is imperative in the case of children from an early
age through adolescence.”67 Even if “counsel was not present for some
permissible reason when an admission was obtained,” the Court wrote, “the
greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the
sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not
the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or
despair.”68
The Court changed course somewhat in Fare v. Michael C.,69 in which
it held that a juvenile defendant had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights,
notwithstanding the fact that he had requested and been denied the
opportunity to speak with his probation officer.70 But even in Fare, the Court
made clear that “special concerns . . . are present when young persons, often
with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are
involved.”71
The Court also cautioned that juvenile voluntariness
assessments “mandate[] . . . evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience,
education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity
to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his . . . rights, and the
consequences of waiving those rights.”72
Finally, the Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to the special care
standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina,73 in which it held “that a child’s age
properly informs the Miranda custody analysis.”74 Drawing on cases from a
range of areas, the Court explained “that children ‘generally are less mature
and responsible than adults,’ . . . that they ‘often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them,’ . . . [and] that they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible
65

Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 45.
67
Id. at 48 (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE’S CODE OF THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT LAW § 822 (3d ed. 1940)); see also id. at 52 (“[A]uthoritative opinion
has cast formidable doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of ‘confessions’ by
children.”).
68
Id. at 55.
69
442 U.S. 707 (1979).
70
Id. at 727.
71
Id. at 725.
72
Id.
73
564 U.S. 261 (2011).
74
Id. at 265.
66
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to . . . outside pressures’ than adults.”75 Even the dissent, written by Justice
Alito, took for granted that “the Court’s precedents . . . make clear that
‘special care’ must be exercised in applying the voluntariness test where the
confession of a ‘mere child’ is at issue.”76
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIAL CARE

Taken together, the cases above stand for the proposition that juveniles
are more vulnerable than adults, and that courts should hesitate longer before
holding their confessions to be voluntary. This proposition is not just the
product of armchair psychology, moreover, but is supported by a rich body
of empirical scholarship.
As the Court recognized in J.D.B., a wealth of social science research
indicates that juveniles are uniquely susceptible to the pressures of
interrogation.77 Unsurprisingly, juveniles are much less likely than adults to
understand78 or exercise79 their Miranda rights. Juveniles also exhibit
numerous developmental differences from adults—including in “their
cognitive abilities to encode, store, and retrieve memories,” their proclivity
“to mak[e] source misattributions,” and their “forgetting, retention, and
relearning curves”80—that jeopardize the reliability of their statements.
In addition, juveniles are significantly less “future oriented” than adults,
both in terms of their ability to anticipate the consequences of their actions
and in terms of their preference for smaller rewards now over larger rewards

75

Id. at 272 (citations omitted) (first quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–
16 (1982); then quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion); and
then quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
76
Id. at 297 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948)
(plurality opinion)).
77
See id. at 269 (majority opinion) (citing Brief for Center on Wrongful Convictions of
Youth, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21–22, J.D.B., 564 U.S. 261 (No. 0911121)); id. at 273 n.5 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
78
Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1157, 1155 tbl.4 (1980) (finding that “juveniles younger than fifteen
manifest significantly poorer comprehension [of their Miranda rights] than adults of
comparable intelligence” and that most juveniles misunderstood at least some of the Miranda
warning statements).
79
J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study
of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339 (1977) (finding
that only about 10% of juveniles refused to waive their rights during interrogation, as
compared with 40% of adults).
80
Jessica Owen-Kostelnik et al., Testimony & Interrogation of Minors: Assumptions
about Maturity and Morality, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 286, 292 (2006).
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later.81 This lack of future orientation creates a heightened risk that a juvenile
will “falsely confess out of a desire to return home, believing that his
innocence will be straightened out later.”82 And that risk is compounded by
the fact that juveniles “are less capable of withstanding interpersonal stress
and thus more likely to perceive aversive interrogation as intolerable.”83
Finally, juveniles are “more suggestible if they are questioned by
authority figures such as police, and if they believe that the interrogators are
already knowledgeable about the subject of the interview.”84 Myriad studies
have explored interviewers’ ability to shape juveniles’ responses.85 Some of
these studies suggest that interrogators can use positive and negative
reinforcement to elicit responses from juveniles that are not only false, but
also absurd.86
Juveniles’ heightened susceptibility is not confined to the laboratory
setting. To the contrary, research suggests that juvenile false confessions
have been a major source of wrongful convictions over the past few decades.
According to the National Registry of Exonerations, which “collects,
analyzes and disseminates information about all known exonerations of
innocent criminal defendants in the United States, from 1989 to the
present,”87 roughly 12% of exonerated defendants of all ages confessed to
crimes that they did not commit.88 When only juvenile exonerees are
considered, the percentage who falsely confessed jumps to 36%, and when
those under age fourteen are separated out, it jumps again to 86%.89
81

Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay
Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 39 (2009).
82
INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, REDUCING RISKS: AN EXECUTIVE’S GUIDE TO
EFFECTIVE JUVENILE INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION 9 (2012), https://www.theiacp.org/
sites/default/files/all/p-r/ReducingRisksAnExecutiveGuidetoEffectiveJuvenileInterviewand
Interrogation.pdf [perma.cc/73MP-9Z4V].
83
RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 233–34 (2008).
84
F. James Billings et al., Can Reinforcement Induce Children to Falsely Incriminate
Themselves?, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 126 (2007) (citations omitted).
85
See id. (canvassing studies).
86
See, e.g., Sena Garven et al., Allegations of Wrongdoing: The Effects of Reinforcement
on Children’s Mundane and Fantastic Claims, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 38, 42–43 (2000)
(finding that, when subjected to positive and negative reinforcement, a majority of five to
seven-year-olds agreed to a number of fantastical suggestions, including that they had been
taken to a farm on a helicopter, were shown animals there, and were allowed to ride a horse).
87
Our Mission, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/mission.aspx [perma.cc/J97E-KJK7].
88
Age and Mental Status of Exonerated Defendants Who Confessed, NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Age%20and%
20Mental%20Status%20of%20Exonerated%20Defendants%20Who%20Falsely%20Confess
%20Table.pdf [perma.cc/J9C2-9BT9].
89
Id.
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These statistics, moreover, radically understate the total number of
juvenile false confessions that take place in the United States. First, the
Registry data includes only individuals who were convicted of their crimes,
and most false confessions do not result in a conviction.90 Second, the data
includes only individuals who were exonerated, and exoneration is incredibly
difficult to achieve, particularly for defendants who have confessed to the
crimes of which they are accused.91 When one considers that roughly one
million juveniles are arrested each year,92 the total number of juvenile false
confessions becomes potentially dramatic.
II. MISAPPLYING THE STANDARD
The Supreme Court has made clear that juvenile interrogations need to
be evaluated with special care. And the research just discussed resoundingly
confirms that need, particularly in light of juveniles’ developmental deficits
and disproportionate tendency to make false confessions. In recent decades,
however, courts have failed “to take into account the unique vulnerability of
children on a case-by-case basis.”93 Instead, research indicates that courts
have “exclude[d] only the most egregiously obtained confessions and then
only haphazardly.”94 The resulting state of affairs is one in which lower
courts “have largely abdicated their responsibility to review a juvenile’s
waiver of rights during custodial interrogation with the ‘special caution’
required by due process.”95
90

See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the PostDNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 900 (2004); Samuel Gross & Maurice Possley, For 50
Years, You’ve Had “The Right to Remain Silent”, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 12, 2006, 10:00
PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/06/12/for-50-years-you-ve-had-the-right-toremain-silent [perma.cc/9Z2S-GFLT].
91
Gross & Possley, supra note 90.
92
See OJJDP, JUVENILE ARRESTS, supra note 1.
93
Steven A. Drizin, The Lee Arthur Hester Case and the Unfinished Business of the
United States Supreme Court to Protect Juveniles During Police Interrogations, 6 NW. J. L.
& SOC. POL’Y 358, 398 (2011) [hereinafter The Lee Arthur Hester Case]; Steven A. Drizin &
Beth A. Colgan, Tales from the Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard Police
Interrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile Suspects,
in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 127, 130 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004)
(“[T]here are legions of cases in which judges have ignored or paid lip service to the unique
vulnerabilities of children in the interrogation process . . . .”).
94
BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
118 (1999); see Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 38, at 161 (“[T]he lower courts have applied
the doctrine in a haphazard manner, usually rejecting involuntariness claims in all but the most
extreme sets of circumstances.”).
95
Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect
Children from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 431, 434; see Kevin Lapp, Taking Back Juvenile Confessions, 64 UCLA L. REV.
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In order to better understand lower courts’ failures, this Part explores
some of the most common ways in which these courts misapply the special
care standard. The discussion below is not meant to be exhaustive, but it is
instead intended to provide a framework for analyzing opinions and
arguments that stray from established Supreme Court precedent. This Part is
also not meant to imply that courts fail to apply special care whenever they
hold that a juvenile confession is voluntary. To the contrary, many courts
have held juvenile confessions to be voluntary without succumbing to the
pitfalls described below,96 and Part III offers lower courts guidance that will
help them apply the special care standard even if they ultimately admit the
confessions under review. Where courts have committed the errors discussed
in this Part, however, their decisions should not be upheld.
A. FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE

One of the most common ways in which lower courts misapply the
special care standard is by failing to acknowledge the standard at all. Instead,
these courts evaluate the voluntariness of juvenile confessions through the
lens of the generic totality-of-the-circumstances test, without any indication
that juvenile confessions raise unique concerns or require a different inquiry.
The resulting analyses are identical to those that the courts would have
conducted if they were evaluating confessions extracted from mature adults.
Although an exhaustive accounting of such opinions would be
unwieldy, the following examples are illustrative of broader trends in the case

902, 927 (2017) (“[S]pecial solicitude for juvenile suspects . . . has faded from modern
jurisprudence.”).
96
See, e.g., In re Luis P., 74 N.Y.S.3d 221, 230–33 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); People v.
Murdock, 979 N.E.2d 74, 81–90 (Ill. 2012); Rodriguez v. Com., 578 S.E.2d 78, 83–87 (Va.
Ct. App. 2003); State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1113–18 (N.J. 2000).
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law.97 In Vega v. State,98 the Court of Appeals of Texas reviewed the capital
murder conviction of Marie Lisette Garcia Vega, who was sentenced to life
in prison for crimes committed at sixteen years old.99 Shortly after her arrest,
Vega gave inculpatory statements to police officers, and the trial court denied
her motion to suppress.100 After several rounds of appeals,101 the court held
that Vega’s confession had been properly admitted.102 In evaluating the
voluntariness of Vega’s confession, the court made no reference to the
heightened standard that applies to juveniles.103 Instead, the court stated only
that it was required to “examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation to determine if a confession was voluntary and
uncoerced.”104 After reciting the facts of Vega’s interrogation, the court
concluded that the totality-of-the-circumstances standard had been satisfied,
again without mentioning Vega’s age.105
Even more striking than Vega is Hamwright v. State,106 in which the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland upheld the trial court’s determination
that the defendant’s confession to carjacking and robbery had been
voluntary.107 Notwithstanding the defendant’s undisputed contention that he

97
See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 588 So. 2d 903, 907–08 (Ala. 1991); J.W. v. State, 751 So. 2d
529, 532–33 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); Surles v. State, 610 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Ala. Crim. App.
1992); Rimpel v. State, 607 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Martin v. State, 568
S.E.2d 754, 757–58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668, 680–81 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011); Matter of Welfare of L.R.B., 373 N.W.2d 334, 337–38 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Morgan
v. State, 681 So. 2d 82, 86–89 (Miss. 1996); State v. Clements, 789 S.W.2d 101, 105–07 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990); In re R.L.H., 116 P.3d 791, 798 (Mont. 2005); In re C.L., 87 P.3d 462, 465
(Mont. 2004); Matter of R. P. S., 623 P.2d 964, 969 (Mont. 1981); State v. Gaines, 483 S.E.2d
396, 406 (N.C. 1997); In re M.D., No. CA2003–12–038, 2004 WL 2505161, at *5–7 (Ohio
Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2004); In Interest of Christopher W., 329 S.E.2d 769, 770 (S.C. Ct. App.
1985); State v. Watkins, No. 01C01-9701-CC-00004, 1997 WL 766462, at *8 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Dec. 12, 1997); Meadoux v. State, 307 S.W.3d 401, 412–13 (Tex. App. 2009), aff’d, 325
S.W.3d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); In re J.A.B., 281 S.W.3d 62, 66 (Tex. App. 2008);
Matthews v. State, 677 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. App. 1984); In Interest of T.S.V., 607 P.2d
827, 828 (Utah 1980); State v. S.S., No. 55403–4–I, 2006 WL 1462784, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct.
App. May 30, 2006).
98
255 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2007).
99
Id. at 90.
100
Id.
101
See Vega v. State, 32 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App. 2000); Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
102
Vega, 255 S.W.3d at 97–101.
103
Id. at 97–99.
104
Id. at 97 (citation omitted).
105
Id. at 99.
106
787 A.2d 824 (Md. App. 2001).
107
Id. at 838.
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was “fifteen years old and had a learning disability” and that he “was kept,
chained and incommunicado, in an interrogation room from about 3 p.m.
until about 1 a.m.,”108 the court concluded with little analysis that it was not
error to deny his motion to suppress.109 In evaluating the defendant’s
argument that his confession was involuntary, the Hamwright court—like the
Vega court—said only that it was required to “analyze the facts by
considering the totality of the circumstances,” and it added that “[t]he same
is true even for a juvenile.”110 Its brief analysis made no other reference to
the defendant’s age.111
As a final example, in State v. Gutierrez,112 the Supreme Court of New
Mexico reviewed a sixteen-year-old defendant’s conviction for murder and
other charges.113 The defendant confessed to the crimes after an aggressive
interrogation in which the detective implied that a confession would lead to
more lenient treatment.114 The court nevertheless held that the confession
was voluntary and that the district court had properly denied the defendant’s
motion to suppress.115 In citing the relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases that
guided its voluntariness analysis, the court made no mention of the special
care requirement, and it referenced the defendant’s age only as one factor of
many in the totality-of-the-circumstances test.116 When it came time to apply
this legal standard, the court’s evaluation of the defendant’s age consisted
entirely of citations to prior cases in which it had stated that defendants even
younger than Gutierrez were capable of giving voluntary confessions.117
B. ACKNOWLEDGING WITHOUT APPLYING

Even where courts acknowledge the heightened standard that governs
juvenile confessions, they often fail to apply it in any meaningful way. The
resulting analyses in these cases are no different than those in the cases above
or in cases involving adult suspects.
108

Id. at 836.
Id. at 838.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
258 P.3d 1024 (N.M. 2011).
113
Id. at 1030.
114
Id. at 1036.
115
Id. at 1037.
116
See id. at 1035 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
117
Id. at 1037 (citing State v. Martinez, 979 P.2d 718 (N.M. 1999); State v. Jonathan M.,
791 P.2d 64 (N.M. 1990)). Ironically, the Gutierrez court’s reference to Martinez appears to
be inaccurate, as the defendant in that case was nearly eighteen years old at the time of his
questioning. 979 P.2d at 724. Similarly, the referenced statement in Jonathan M. was dictum,
as the court in that case held that the defendant’s statement was inadmissible. 791 P.2d at 66.
109
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To offer just a couple examples,118 in State v. Goodwin119 the Supreme
Court of Nebraska considered the second-degree murder conviction of
Jordan M. Goodwin, who admitted at fourteen years old to firing shots that
killed a six-year-old girl.120 The trial court denied Goodwin’s motion to
suppress his confession as involuntary, and the Supreme Court of Nebraska
affirmed.121 In holding that Goodwin’s confession was voluntary, the court
considered both the voluntariness of Goodwin’s waiver of his Miranda rights
and the voluntariness of his confession.122 It quoted the U.S. Supreme
Court’s admonitions in Gault that “admissions and confessions of juveniles
require special caution,”123 and that “the greatest care must be taken to assure
that the admission was voluntary,”124 although it rejected Goodwin’s request
for the imposition of a per se bar that would have prevented juveniles from
waiving their Miranda rights without a lawyer.125
When it came to actually evaluating the voluntariness of Goodwin’s
waiver and confession, however, the court made no reference to the fact of
Goodwin’s age or to the role that Goodwin’s age played in the court’s
analysis.126 Instead, the court reasoned—as it would have in any adult
confession case—that Goodwin had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
because he had been read those rights, had acknowledged that he understood
them, and had failed to state unambiguously that he wished to speak to an
attorney.127 The court also concluded that Goodwin’s confession itself was
118
For additional examples, see, e.g., Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 719–20 (Alaska 1979);
In re Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 185–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015); People v. Thorpe, 641
P.2d 935, 941–42 (Colo. 1982); Harris v. State, 979 So. 2d 372, 375–77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008); J.P. v. State, 895 So. 2d 1202, 1203–04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Swain v. State, 647
S.E.2d 88, 91–92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); People v. Baker, 28 N.E.3d 836, 851–53 (Ill. App. Ct.
2015); People v. Jenkins, 776 N.E.2d 755, 759–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); People v. Golden, 753
N.E.2d 475, 482–83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Ramos, 24 P.3d 95, 98–100 (Kan. 2001);
People v. Walker, No. 284233, 2008 WL 4724265, at *1–3 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2008);
In re SLL, 631 N.W.2d 775, 778–79 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); In re Kenneth S., No. A-01-350,
2002 WL 337760, at *3–5 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2002); State ex rel. A.W., 51 A.3d 793,
806–07 (N.J. 2012); In re M.B., No. 22537, 2005 WL 2995113, at *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
9, 2005); State v. Atkins, No. W2001–02427–CCA–R3–CD, 2003 WL 21339263, at *2–3
(Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2003); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 756 S.E.2d 924, 928–30 (Va.
Ct. App. 2014).
119
774 N.W.2d 733 (Neb. 2009).
120
Id. at 737.
121
Id. at 742–46.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 743 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967)).
124
Id. (quoting Gault, 387 U.S. at 55).
125
See id. at 743–44; see also infra note 161 and accompanying text.
126
See Goodwin, 774 N.W.2d at 744–46.
127
See id.
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voluntary, even though the interrogating officers employed textbook
minimization tactics,128 because the officers made no promises of leniency to
Goodwin.129
In a similar case, People v. Jones,130 the California Court of Appeal
reviewed the murder and attempted murder convictions of Tramel Ray Jones,
who was sentenced to eighty years to life in prison, based in part on a
confession he gave when he was sixteen.131 The trial court denied Jones’s
motion to suppress the confession, despite the fact that the interrogating
officer relied heavily on deception tactics.132 For example, the officer
showed Jones false lineups with his picture circled and falsely told Jones that
the ballistics from the crime scene matched a gun found in Jones’s father’s
home.133 The officer also falsely told Jones that his fingerprints were found
on the gun, and he misleadingly suggested that Jones’s father might be
charged with the crimes if Jones remained silent.134 Finally, the officer told
Jones that he would only “do a little time in [a juvenile] camp” if he
confessed.135
In reciting the applicable legal standard governing Jones’s voluntariness
arguments, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that “courts must use special
care in scrutinizing the record to evaluate a claim that a juvenile’s custodial
confession was not voluntarily given.”136 It nevertheless reasoned, as the
Goodwin court did, that Jones’s Miranda waiver was voluntary, because he
was advised of his rights, said that he understood those rights, and implicitly
waived his rights by answering the officer’s questions.137 Similarly, when
evaluating the voluntariness of Jones’s subsequent confession, the court
made no mention of Jones’s age,138 and it dispensed with his objections to
the interrogating officer’s tactics in the same way that it would have if Jones
128
See id. at 745. For example, “[b]oth officers characterized the event as a ‘tragic
accident,’” and one of the officers stated that “[n]o one means to kill an innocent kid.” Id. The
other officer further speculated that “there was a ‘good chance’ that the shooter did not know
there was a child in the car and that he did not intend to kill her.” Id.; see also infra Section
III.B.
129
See Goodwin, 774 N.W.2d at 745–46.
130
213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017), review denied, No. S240364, 2017 LEXIS
3951, at *1 (Cal. May 10, 2017).
131
Id. at 171.
132
Id. at 184.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 183–84.
135
Id. at 183.
136
Id. at 185 (citation omitted).
137
Id. at 186–87.
138
Id. at 187–89.
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had been an adult. Namely, the court explained that “the use of deceptive
comments does not necessarily render a statement involuntary,”139 and it
cited prior cases—none of which involved juveniles—in which the Supreme
Court of California had permitted the use of deceptive interrogation tactics.140
C. THE STRAW MAN OF PER SE INADMISSIBILITY

A final way in which courts misapply the special care standard is by
misconstruing arguments in favor of heightened scrutiny as arguments in
favor of a per se bar against the admissibility of juvenile confessions. With
the arguments so construed, courts readily dismiss them, as Supreme Court
precedent makes clear that juvenile confessions are admissible under at least
some circumstances.141
Examples are again helpful.142 In State in Interest of P.G.,143 the Court
of Appeals of Utah reviewed a seventeen-year-old defendant’s delinquency
adjudication for aggravated sexual abuse of a child.144 P.G. was arrested after
his five-year-old sister alleged that he had sexually abused her.145 He then
confessed during an interrogation in which “the detective repeatedly told
P.G. that he already knew that P.G. sexually assaulted” his sister, and in
which the detective “refused to accept P.G.’s denials, and . . . shouted once
at P.G. to ‘stop lying.’”146 P.G.’s motion to suppress his confession was
denied, and he argued on appeal that the lower court’s voluntariness analysis
139

Id. at 188 (citation omitted).
See id. at 188–89 (citing People v. Williams, 233 P.3d 1000, 1029–30 (Cal. 2010);
People v. Richardson, 183 P.3d 1146, 1168 (Cal. 2008), modified (July 16, 2008); People v.
Farnam, 47 P.3d 988, 1042 (Cal. 2002), modified (July 31, 2002)).
141
See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979).
142
For other examples, see, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 968 F. Supp. 2d 490, 511
(E.D.N.Y. 2013); Vance v. Bordenkircher, 505 F. Supp. 135, 138 (N.D.W. Va. 1981), aff’d,
692 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1982); Ingram v. State, 918 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996); In
re Jessie L., 182 Cal. Rptr. 396, 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Marshall v. State, 282 S.E.2d 301,
303 (Ga. 1981); State v. Terrick, 857 So. 2d 1153, 1160–61 (La. Ct. App. 2003), writ denied,
871 So. 2d 346 (La. 2004); State v. Hance, 233 A.2d 326, 330 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967);
Woodham v. State, 779 So. 2d 158, 161 (Miss. 2001); State v. Harris, 781 S.W.2d 137, 143
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Garner, 614 N.W.2d 319, 327 (Neb. 2000); People v. De Flumer,
251 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), aff’d, 209 N.E.2d 93 (N.Y. 1965); State v.
McKinney, 570 S.E.2d 238, 243 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); In re Mellott, 217 S.E.2d 745, 746–47
(N.C. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Smith, No. C-75588, 1977 WL 199638, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 16, 1977); State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 164–66 (S.C. 2007); R.G. v. State, 416 P.3d
478, 484 (Utah 2017); State v. Unga, 196 P.3d 645, 652 (Wash. 2008).
143
343 P.3d 297 (Utah Ct. App. 2015).
144
Id. at 300.
145
Id. at 299.
146
Id. at 301–02; see infra Section III.B (discussing maximization techniques); Section
III.D (discussing leading questions).
140
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had failed to assign appropriate weight to P.G.’s age, among other factors.147
Instead of evaluating whether P.G.’s age made him vulnerable to the
detective’s concededly “aggressive” techniques,148 however, the Court of
Appeals rejected P.G.’s challenge on the simple grounds that “P.G.’s age
does not render his confession involuntary”149—a per se argument that P.G.
never advanced. The court then noted in two brief sentences that P.G. was
nearly eighteen years old at the time of his confession and that “the Utah
Supreme Court has found juveniles younger than P.G. to have voluntarily
confessed,” before concluding that P.G.’s confession was not clearly
involuntary.150
Similarly, in State v. Fisher,151 the Court of Appeal of Louisiana
affirmed a lower court judgment denying the suppression of a sixteen-yearold defendant’s confession to armed robbery.152 In reviewing the defendant’s
challenge to the voluntariness of his confession, the court recited the relevant
legal standards—including that the evaluation of a juvenile confession
should be conducted “under the totality of the circumstances standard
applicable to adults, supplemented by consideration of other very significant
factors relevant to the juvenile status of the accused”153—before briefly
reviewing the defendant’s interrogation. The court noted that the defendant’s
mother was present, that both of them were advised of and waived their
rights, that the defendant said he understood his rights, and that the defendant
affirmed that “no promises, threats, or pressure [were] used against him.”154
The court concluded based on this cursory analysis that the defendant’s
confession was voluntary; it rejected the suggestion that the defendant’s age
weighed against admission of his confession, writing that “there is no federal
or state constitutional basis for invalidating an otherwise valid confession
simply because the defendant has not quite reached the age of 17 and
achieved non-juvenile status.”155
III. DEFINING SPECIAL CARE
As the foregoing cases make clear, lower courts regularly fail to apply
special care when evaluating juvenile confessions. This failure may owe in
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

P.G., 343 P.3d at 301.
Id.
Id. at 302.
Id.
87 So. 3d 189 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 196.
Id. at 195 (quoting State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485, 489 (La. 1998)).
Id.
Id. at 196.
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part to basic oversight by the courts, but it is also attributable to the malleable
nature of the special care standard itself.156 When compounded with the fact
that the Supreme Court has not decided a juvenile voluntariness case in
decades,157 this malleability has allowed courts to stray from the principles
first announced in Haley, Gallegos, and Gault.158 In order to tether courts
more closely to these principles, this Part tries to define special care by
delineating the factors that courts should consider when evaluating juvenile
confessions.
In defining special care, this Part does not advance proposals that would
create new procedural protections for juveniles or that would expand existing
ones. This Part does not propose, for example, that all juvenile interrogations
be recorded,159 that the provision of counsel be mandatory in juvenile
interrogations,160 or that courts adopt other per se rules whose violation
would trigger the exclusion of juvenile confessions.161 While such proposals
are certainly worth considering, they have been defended at length in the
existing literature, and their adoption would likely require innovation by
legislatures and courts.
Instead, this Part offers guidance on the proper application of current
Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, this Part maintains that special care

156

See Yekaterina Berkovich, Note, Ensuring Protection of Juveniles’ Rights: A Better
Way of Obtaining a Voluntary Miranda Waiver, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 561, 577–81 (2014);
Drizin, The Lee Arthur Hester Case, supra note 93.
157
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). Although the Court reaffirmed the special
care requirement in J.D.B., it did not rule on the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession
in that case. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 268 n.3 (2011).
158
See supra Section I.B.
159
See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles After
Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 444 (2008); Steven A. Drizin & Beth A.
Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogations Is the Solution to
Illinois’ Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 337, 340 (2001); Lawrence
Schlam, Police Interrogation of Children and State Constitutions: Why Not Videotape the
MTV Generation?, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 901, 902–03 (1995); Christine S. Scott-Hayward,
Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent Development and Police Interrogation, 31
L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 73 (2007).
160
See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUST., THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 87 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf
[perma.cc/KPU4-MGXZ]; Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal
Significance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re
Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 125, 149 (2007); Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 38, at 170.
161
See, e.g., Michael Wayne Brooks, Comment, Kids Waiving Goodbye to Their Rights:
An Argument Against Juveniles’ Ability to Waive Their Right to Remain Silent During Police
Interrogations, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 219, 245 (2004); David T. Huang, Note, “Less
Unequal Footing”: State Courts’ Per Se Rules for Juvenile Waivers During Interrogations
and the Case for Their Implementation, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 437, 438 (2001).
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requires courts to evaluate whether interrogators have used tactics that are
disproportionately coercive when applied to juveniles. Special care, after all,
is nothing more than a recognition of juveniles’ heightened susceptibility to
the pressures of interrogation. It stands to reason that courts should focus on
those pressures that are known to exacerbate juveniles’ unique
vulnerabilities.
When reading the discussion below, it is important to note that the list
of tactics is not exhaustive. Although this Part aims to highlight those
methods that are most concerning when used in juvenile interrogations, there
are almost certainly additional factors that courts should consider when
applying special care. Furthermore, this Part does not suggest that the use of
the tactics below should result in the automatic invalidation of juvenile
confessions, as courts must always engage in a subjective inquiry about
whether interrogation techniques were coercive “as applied to the unique
characteristics of a particular suspect.”162 These tactics should nevertheless
be considered, and they should weigh against the conclusion in any given
case that a juvenile’s confession was voluntary. The more of these tactics
that were used, the greater the weight should be.
A. ISOLATION

The first factor that courts should consider is the isolation of juvenile
suspects from attorneys, parents, or other interested adults. This section
mentions the factor only briefly, as its inclusion in the special care analysis
(when that analysis is applied) is already commonplace. The Supreme Court
put particular weight on isolation in both Haley163 and Gallegos,164 and lower
courts and legislatures have emphasized that the absence of a friendly adult
weighs heavily against the admission of a juvenile’s confession.165

162

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985).
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599–600 (1948) (plurality opinion) (“[A] lad of tender
years . . . needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of
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The fact that isolation from friendly adults puts disproportionate
pressure on juveniles is intuitive, and it is supported generally by the research
discussed in Section I.C. regarding youths’ immaturity and heighted
susceptibility to outside pressures.166 Courts should note, however, that
children will not always be helped by the presence of an untrained advocate,
as studies suggest that “these adults, often passive, frequently urge their
youths to cooperate with police.”167 As a result, courts should place
particular weight on isolation from attorneys and other professional
advocates, whose absence should militate unequivocally against the
admission of a juvenile confession.168
B. MAXIMIZATION AND MINIMIZATION

In addition to isolation, two of the most commonly used classes of
interrogation techniques are those involving “maximization” and
“minimization.”169 The former refers to a category of “‘hard-sell’
technique[s] in which the interrogator tries to scare and intimidate the suspect
into confessing by making false claims about evidence (e.g., staging an
eyewitness identification or a fraudulent lie-detector test) and exaggerating
the seriousness of the offense and the magnitude of the charges.”170 The latter
describes “‘soft-sell’ technique[s] in which the police interrogator tries to lull
the suspect into a false sense of security by offering sympathy, tolerance,
face-saving excuses, and even moral justification, by blaming a victim or
accomplice, by citing extenuating circumstances, or by playing down the
seriousness of the charges.”171 Together, interrogators use these kinds of
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tactics “to manipulate a suspect into thinking that it is in his or her best
interest to confess.”172
Although empirical studies have suggested that maximization and
minimization techniques give rise to false confessions for suspects of all
ages,173 the Supreme Court has generally allowed these techniques in cases
involving adults.174 With juveniles, however, these tactics carry unique risks.
Not only do maximization techniques play on juveniles’ unique
susceptibilities, but the use of false evidence of guilt is also “especially
convincing to youth, who are very susceptible to influence exerted by
authority figures and may be reluctant to correct misinformation presented
by such figures.”175 Likewise, minimization techniques have a greater
influence on juveniles than they do on adults, as juveniles more often “lack
the requisite capacity and savviness to resist subtle pressures exerted through
a minimization narrative.”176 Minimization techniques are also “tailored by
police to be especially persuasive to children and adolescents, creating
narratives more likely to be compelling to youth.”177
Given the disproportionate effect that maximization and minimization
strategies have on children, courts should consider them carefully when
evaluating juvenile confessions. Courts should be particularly vigilant with
respect to minimization techniques, as these techniques “generally involve[]
a gentle, friendly approach in which the interrogator attempts to gain the
suspect’s trust.”178 As a result, minimization tactics might look benign, or
even preferable, when applied to juveniles, when in fact they are especially
pernicious.
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C. DECEPTION

As discussed above, maximization and minimization strategies often
rely on the use of deception in order to pressure suspects into confessing.
Deception tactics warrant a broader discussion of their own, however, as they
are not coextensive with maximization and minimization,179 and they are
both commonplace and particularly likely to be coercive when applied to
juveniles.
As a general matter, the Supreme Court has sanctioned deception in
police interrogation of adults,180 even though deceptive tactics can lead to
false confessions.181 As with maximization and minimization, however,
deception raises unique concerns in the context of juvenile interrogations.182
Where interrogators present suspects with false evidence of guilt, for
example, juveniles are made particularly vulnerable by their “reliance on gut
instincts and emotional impulses . . . because such tactics force suspects
either to confess or rationally to rebut the alleged proof against them.”183
Juveniles are also more suggestible than adults, and “when placed in high
pressure interrogations, . . . are much more likely to change their stories and
even to confess to crimes they did not commit.”184
Juveniles’ susceptibility to false evidence has been studied in the
laboratory setting, with striking results. In one of the better-known
experiments on the topic, researchers instructed subjects to type letters on a
computer keyboard, but not to touch the ALT key, as doing so would cause
the computer to crash.185 The researchers then caused the computer to crash
during the typing exercise, and they asked the (factually innocent) subjects
179
For example, if a police officer obtains a confession by posing as a suspect’s cellmate,
see, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990), then he will have deceived the suspect,
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to sign a statement admitting to hitting the ALT key.186 Some subjects were
presented with a false printout indicating that they had hit the ALT key, and,
of those subjects, juveniles were significantly more likely than young adults
to sign the admission statement.187 Most notably, 88% of fifteen and sixteenyear-olds presented with the false printout signed the statement admitting to
hitting the ALT key.188
Clearly, laboratory settings differ in important ways from interrogation
rooms, but they nevertheless provide support for the proposition that
juveniles are disproportionately susceptible to deception. In addition to the
presentation of false evidence, interrogators use deception to operate on
juveniles’ susceptibility by falsely downplaying suspects’ culpability.189
While subtle, this form of deception has been found to communicate
expectations of lenient sentencing “as effectively as . . . an explicit promise”
of leniency.190 The Supreme Court has held that promises of leniency can
render even an adult confession involuntary,191 and courts must be
particularly vigilant when such promises are not only made to juveniles, but
also implied through the false downplaying of juveniles’ culpability. For
example, where interrogators (falsely) tell a juvenile suspect that “everything
[i]s going to be O.K.,”192 that his role in the crime “was not his fault,”193 and
that his actions “were completely ‘understandable,’”194 courts should be
hesitant in concluding that any subsequent confession was voluntarily given.
Although such tactics may be permissible when used with adults, they are
disproportionately likely to cause juveniles to “confess merely as a way to
escape the isolation and anxiety that permeates the interrogation room.”195
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D. LEADING AND FACT-FEEDING

Even where interrogators refrain from using deception, they may
unintentionally coerce juveniles through the use of leading questions and
fact-feeding. In any interrogation, these tactics make for bad practice, as they
risk contaminating the suspect’s confession, thereby undermining law
enforcement’s confidence that obtained information truly originated with the
suspect. For this reason, “[p]olice have long been trained not to contaminate
a confession by feeding or leaking crucial facts,”196 and interrogation training
manuals have made clear that “[l]eading questions are not to be asked, at least
not as to crucial corroborated details concerning the crime.”197
When applied to juveniles, leading questions and fact-feeding are even
more dangerous. Research has shown that juveniles are more likely to adopt
false narratives when subjected to repeated questioning and other forms of
pressure.198 And juveniles are particularly susceptible to such pressures
when the individual questioning them is an adult.199 Moreover, when leading
questions are repeated, juveniles “may assume they gave the ‘wrong’ answer
the first time, and feel pressure to provide the ‘right’ answer.”200 As a result,
when it comes to minors, some research suggests that “leading questions
based on the actual evidence . . . are as likely as fraudulent tactics to cause a
false confession.”201
Juveniles’ susceptibility to leading questions and fact-feeding has been
demonstrated in numerous high-profile false confession cases in which
suspects were alleged to know facts that were available only to the
perpetrator and the police. In the case of Jeffrey Deskovic,202 for example, a
sixteen-year-old boy was arrested for the rape and murder of his classmate,
based on accurate diagrams that he drew of the crime scene and other
196
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information he provided “about the crime that only the killer would know,”
such as the existence of a handwritten note that was found with the victim’s
body.203 Even though Deskovic was excluded at the outset of the
investigation as the source of DNA found at the crime scene, he was
nevertheless tried and convicted, and he spent sixteen years in prison before
the DNA was matched to another man who confessed to the crime.204
A postmortem of the conviction prepared at the request of the district
attorney’s office concluded that there were two possible ways in which
Deskovic could have obtained his inside information: “either the police
(deliberately or inadvertently) communicated this information directly to
Deskovic or their questioning at the high school and elsewhere caused this
supposedly secret information to be widely known throughout the
community.”205 While we cannot prove which of these possibilities occurred,
“[g]iven the level of specificity reportedly provided by Deskovic, the second
and more troubling possibility, that the officers disclosed facts to him, seems
far more likely.”206
Even more disturbing than the Deskovic case is the story of Ryan Harris.
Harris was an eleven-year-old girl who was raped and murdered in 1998.207
Not long after her body was found, two boys, one seven and one eight, were
charged with “striking [Harris] with a rock, sexually molesting her and
suffocating her with her own underwear.”208 After being questioned by the
police, the two boys “independently described how they knocked the girl off
her bike, hit her in the head with a brick, dragged her into weeds, and sexually
molested her, leaving her to die—facts that matched the crime.”209 While the
police initially maintained that “the boys gave statements that contained
details of the crime that only the true killers would have known,” the
prosecution dropped the charges against the boys after semen was found on
Harris’s underpants, and a perfect DNA match was later made with a man
who had previously been charged with sexually assaulting young girls.210 To
203
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the extent that the boys did in fact provide details that “only the true killers
would have known,” these details were almost certainly fed to them (whether
intentionally or unintentionally) by the interrogating officers.
***
The interrogation tactics discussed in this Part—isolation, maximization
and minimization, deception, and leading and fact-feeding—present unique
risks when applied to juvenile suspects. Each one plays on a range of
vulnerabilities that are common in children, but that are not present, or are
present only to a lesser extent, in adults. Given the Supreme Court’s
admonition that juveniles not “be judged by the more exacting standards of
maturity,”211 review of these tactics is a natural starting point for courts
conducting a special care analysis.
Of course, courts should not automatically suppress a confession if
some or all of the tactics discussed in this Part have been used. And courts
should make sure to consider arguments regarding other kinds of tactics that
are not discussed here. This Part nevertheless provides a framework for the
proper application of the special care standard: where interrogators use
tactics that are particularly coercive for juveniles, the use of these tactics
should weigh against the admission of the confession.
CONCLUSION
For the better part of the last century, the Supreme Court has recognized
that juvenile suspects are uniquely vulnerable to the pressures of police
interrogation. In order to mitigate the constitutional risks created by this
vulnerability, the Court has consistently reaffirmed the importance of
applying special care when evaluating juvenile confessions. Unfortunately,
lower courts have often failed to recognize the importance of this standard,
and they have strayed from the principles first announced by the Court in
Haley, Gallegos, and Gault. At the same time, social science and false
confession studies have confirmed the need for special care, and they have
even made that need more pronounced.
This Article does not purport to solve the problem of involuntary
confessions or to provide an exhaustive accounting of the relevant case law
or empirical literature. Instead, it aims to highlight the importance of the
special care requirement and to provide guidance regarding its application.
My hope is that litigants, judges, and other legal actors will use the discussion
above to frame their analyses and ensure that juvenile confessions receive the
special care that they demand.
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